2.03.2002

I have been meaning to return to your insight about a relationship between the move in remark 7 regarding particular language-games adding up only to another language-game and Russell's theory of types. It struck me as suggestive, but I needed to review the significance of the theory of types for Russell's analytic philosophy. I turned to Ray Monk for help. Wittgenstein developed a criticism of Russell's theory of types in 1913. This criticism was based on Frege's theory of symbolism. As Wittgenstein wrote Russell, "all theory of types must be done away with by a theory of symbolism showing that what seem to be different kinds of things are symbolised by different kinds of symbols which cannot possibly be substituted in one another's places." The supplanting of the theory of types turns on Russel's analysis of the proposition "Socrates is mortal," where mortality and Socrates were held to be different types of things. Wittgenstein observed that given this division of things, the theory of types could not tell him that the substitution "Mortality is Socrates," is non-sensical. ("Mortal is Socrates" would not appear nonsensical. What Wittgenstein wanted to show was the difference between the name and the attribute of the person so named.) What we are seeing is different types of symbols. This erases the duality of language and the world of things, and seeks an interior analysis of logic.
Your observation of the relation between this dismissal of the theory of types for a description of how symbols are used in a proposition and the inescapability of language-games shows a deep connection between the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus and the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations. The connection only goes so far. What remains in the early work is the Kantian duality of the noumenal and the phenomenal where the former is consigned to silence. However, the interior perspective sought in logic does become an interior view of language-games. (I'm not all that happy with this attempt to summarize the relation.)

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