7.29.2002

As I was reading your latest entry, a question arose for me: What would it mean not to believe in correspondence? Would it mean, contra naive realism, that there is no external reality apprehensible by us? That reality is from foundation to rooftop a linguistic creation? This seems to be a recipe for solipsism. What we are saying is the relation of word to object is not linear. That is, correspondence is not a formula for truth. But in our ordinary language we do not have this expectation. We only hope to disclose features of the world with words, sentences, commands, questions, etc.? Correspondence is one language game among many; and its unique feature is the realism presumed in the very act of corresponding words with things. All Wittgenstein is doing is eliminating the epistemological privileging of correspondence found in Logical Positivism/Empiricism.

What would it mean not to believe in correspondence? Does deconstructionism lead to existential instability? More to think through. I like the image of a house and yard. How many skills or practices do we employ or cultivate to create a comfortable place for ourselves? The more you reflect on this the longer the list becomes (as Wittgenstein knew).

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