7.28.2003

[104,105] The topography of the remarks are beginning to turn toward those justly famous inquiries into the purpose of philosophy. But 104 is grammatically enigmatic. It is difficult to gain a sense of what Wittgenstein is saying here. I think the idea is that by pulling concepts from contexts we (philosophers) heighten the comparability. We can represent "language," "thought," and "world" as synonymous. In engaging in this sort of comparison that reveals unities, "we think we are perceiving a state of affairs of the highest generality." Notice how "perceive" is used here. Perception is a product of the language-game of metaphysics; and it is a form of delusion. But the order is interesting: we do not describe what we see, we describe in order to see. (I'll return to this."
In 105, an epistemological turn occurs when are expectations about the purity of the ideal are not met by ordinary conditions. We cannot connect the sublime and the pedestrian. "And we rack our brains over the nature of the real sign. --It is perhaps the idea of the sign? Or the idea at the present moment?" The philosopher's expectation is that the ideal exercise authority over the ordinary. Episteme ought to translate into power. Pace Plato, and others, however, the ordinary proves recalcitrant and devious. It does not bow down to the illumination afforded by philosophical truth.

0 Comments:

Post a Comment

<< Home